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EDITORIAL
A new literary arts magazine appeared in the bookstore recently. Its
declaration of intent, put forth in the form of a "Publisher's Note," shock
ed me. The first sentence reeked of caustic self-righteousness as it stated,
To spite the present flood of media and information, we offer an issue
of..." Imagine starting a literary magazine for spite! Such a negative and
ambiguous ethos should serve to repulse more contributors than it attracts.
But the sad point to be made is that such editorials, as bold and
iconoclastic as they may appear, are in essence very trendy and trivial.
The editors who write these pretentious statements of intent for their new
literary journals have obviously forgotten the battles fought by their
precursors just to secure the right to publish freely. This brings to mind the
supression of the Chicago Review in 1959 by the administration of the
University of Chicago, which forbid the inclusion of certain authors in the
winter issue. And how can anyone connected with publishing bemoan the
"present flood of media and information" so soon after the communist
purge and Cold War mentality tried to stem and rechannel it?
Hil{a has no intention of becoming a political forum for debate, but we
do recognize our role and responsibility as a vehicle for thought on matters
pertaining to the liberal arts. For instance, this issue contains an essay
which compares computer and human intelligence. The staff encourages
submissions addressing topics other than art or literary criticism, although
these are welcome as well. Greg Polly's essay, The Mythical, the
Ethical, und the Aesthetic in Pilgrim's Progress, achieves an excellent
synthesis of inquiry as it draws from the disciplines of philosophy, religion,
and literature in its analysis of Bunyan's important work.
The purpose of Hi^a is to publish writing, poetry, and artwork which
we believe will stimulate our readers, and at the same time afford our con
tributors the opportunity to receive constructive criticism from the
Kenyon community. One of Robert Lowell's biographers pointed out that
some of his worst poems appeared in Hil^a while he was a student at
Kenyon. They may have contained some brilliant lines or images, but they
failed overall as poems. I use this example to impress upon future contributors the understanding that Hil{a is looking for material which shows
strong potential. As a college literary journal we do not expect submissions
of professional caliber.
Much of the material published in this issue concerns the subject of
death. The staff did not encourage or anticipate any theme; in fact , we
were very surprised to receive so many outstanding submissions dealing
with the same topic. At first we thought we might have adopted an un
conscious "morbid" bias in our selection procedure—fostered by the anxie
ty created by a tight exam schedule and the even tighter quarters of our of
fice. We dismissed that notion and then wondered if the despair of a com
mon existential crisis gripped Kenyon's undergraduate artistic community.
But this is unlikely. Simply put, we chose the work that impressed us the

most on an individual basis.
Although HiJ^a has been in existence for forty'three years, this is the
first issue for this staff. In the past, Hifya, like many other small literary
journals, has been called elitist, pretentious, and "new wave", depending
upon which era in our history one chooses to cite. To the credit of this
staff, we have not received many of these criticisms. Painful care was
taken to maintain the anonymity of the contributor during the selection
process, and deadlines were extended to allow as many submissions as
possible.
Our only serious problem this year has been inadequate funding. This is
nothing new or unique to this student organization; however, our budget
has been cut back for so many years that it has never been allowed to
recover. The size and scope of this issue has already been compromised. It
is distributing that a college so well known for its literary prowess is
unable to adequately fund its own literary journal. Ironically, the existed
tial crisis we detected may have been our own. With a legacy of student
writers and editors that includes Robert Lowell, E.L. Doctorow, Pulitzer
Prize winner James Wright, and contributing artists that are now on the
Kenyon faculty, must we fight to justify our existence? The Chicago
Review had sufficient funding, but died from a lack of administrative sano
tion. Hil{a finds itself with the opposite problem. The staff and those con'
cerned urge the faculty, administration, and student body to help us rec
tify this situation, and prove that the theme of this issue is not portentous.
Stuart Sheppard
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Hiking in a pass above the Teton River,
Puffing against a long deer path
Climb in spare air, we pushed
A boulder down a loose slide:
Four sets of legs straining,
Braced backs against the castle cliff.
A hawk nesting in a rock hollow
Far up in the turret glided
Out, wing tips upturned, at the
Crack as the boulder gave way,
Rocked over its gravel shelf.
End over end, corner to point, width
Over width it righted its path down
The fifty'score until in its unevenness it
Skipped into the air, touching down on
The slope like a flat stone thrown against
The surface of a pond. Fragments of rock
Shattered into the twilight as, roll
Upon quicker roll, the ragged torso of
Stone spent its energy in its own destruction.
The plunging remains of the boulder,
A sculpted head of rock, struck
Another embedded by the slide
And leapt one final arc
Into the timberline, leaving as
Its epitaph the script of reshifting pebbles
That flowed on the mountainside.
And the blending echo of the first
Crack with the last frozen glass shatter.
William Marchl
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ANGST
Ellen Watson
"a tantalizing dish . . . ." And five below it, just
above the desserts, was sole amandine, "a fillet of
the finest . . . ." Would the corner of the page even'
tually break off if he bent it enough?
The desserts looked good—cheesecake, Black
Forest torte, raspberry tart, and the classic single
scoop of vanilla ice cream. If he had the sole, he
would get a dessert. If he had the chicken, probably
not. Was the cheesecake good here?
"Dear, is the cheesecake good here?"
She laughed at him; so did her friends. "Honey,
you haven't even ordered dinner yet. Are you hav'
ing cheesecake instead of the sole?"
"—or croquettes. No, I just wondered."
"Well, I don't know if the cheesecake's good
here." She volleyed the question to her friend's hus'
band, "Do you, Jim?"
He adjusted the knot in his tie. "I'm not much of a
cheesecake eater, myself," and smiled feebly at his
host.
He sighed. Chicken or sole. Dessert or no dessert.
His eyes darted from one to the other. The croquet'
tes sat proudly high on the list of entrees, but the
sole, resting modestly at the bottom, quietly sug'
gested who knows what hidden delights?
Well, white wine, for sure. "I'd like white wine, I
think," he shot to his wife. "Should I get a bottle or
just a glass?"
"Well, I'm having the Wellington, so I need red.
Just get the glass."
"Is that alright with you?" he asked her friend.
"Oh, yes. I like Rose."
". . . and you?" he asked her husband.
"Well, I'm having the quiche, so why don't you
and I split a half'Carafe?"
"I don't know if they have them."
"We'll ask?"
"Fine. We can ask." White wine, and enough for
dinner and dessert. Cheesecake sort of goes with
white wine, unless it has cherries on it. He would
ask.
"Are we all ready, then?" his wife asked the
group.

The waitress handed him the menu and said,
"Here you go, sir. Our soup today is cream of broc'
coli, and the special is the mushroom onion quiche."
"Thank-you." He didn't have to worry about
those two dishes. The waitress smiled, about as
warmly as a plastic fireplace. He dismissed her with
a nod.
He opened the menu. Page one, "About the
Restaurant." Page two, "Appetizers." He turned
another page and it crackled between his fingers.
Expensive paper. There we go, pages three and
four, "Entrees."
A quick look and he found his two options—the
chicken croquettes and sole amandine. Both would
go with white wine. Both came with salad, roll, and
vegetable. He bent the corner of the page back and
forth. Chicken and sole. Both were on the right side
of the menu—well, that didn't matter, really, He
rocked the menu up and down using the edge of the
table as a fulcrum. Chicken croquettes are
sometimes dry. He read: "a tantalizing dish of fresh
chicken rolled in our special seasoned bread crumbs
and deep fried, served with mushrooms or cheese
sauce." Well, not dry with a sauce.
Now, how long had it been since he had eaten
fish? Too long—he couldn't remember. "A fillet of
the finest Dover sole, sprinkled with almond
slivers." Pure, fish is. No need for mushroom or
cheese sauce.
. . . Although cheese sauce can be very good,
especially over chicken croquettes. He peered over
the top of the menu at his dinner guests. His wife
looked like a schoolgirl, laughing with her hand over
her mouth. On her right, her friend was adjusting a
red scarf around her neck, and shaking her head at
her husband. He must have made a joke.
"What are you having, dear?" he asked his wife.
"I thought the crab looked good."
"I'm stuck between the croquettes and the sole."
"Mm," she said, creasing her brow. "Tough
choice."
"Mm," he agreed, and looked back at page four.
There it was, third one down, chicken croquettes,
7

Wait! he thought.
I am.
I am.
He looked frantically from the chicken croquettes,
to the sole amandine, to the three pairs of eyes
directed his way. Um, I will be." He coughed a
nervous laugh.
The friend's husband chuckled. "I thought you executives made decisions all day long."
He felt his ears flushing red, the back of his neck
getting warm. "They're usually more clear-cut."
The husband laughed again.
"Is everyone ready to order here?" The plastic
waitress again. A tiny claw of anxiety snatched at
his chest. Chicken or sole, chicken or sole,
CHICKEN OR SOLE?
He looked up at four pairs of eyes. "Um," he stuttered, "Why don't you start, dear?"
White wine was settled. White wine went with
both of them. Cheesecake. Cheesecake might not go
with the wine. No dessert
then—so he would get the
chicken. He gave a little nod of
confirmation to himself, and just
•x
/
then a vision of a filet of the
finest Dover sole crashed into
his head and wouldn't leave.
c *
Silence. The table was silent.
c V,v;
He could feel little beads of
* r
V
sweat breaking out on each tern'
pie. "Miss, are there cherries on
the cheesecake?"
His wife and the husband stifled laughs.
"There's plain, chocolate, cherry and blueberry."
Another silence. Were his hands shaking?
"Could I have just a few more minutes?"
The waitress said, "Certainly, sir," like a school
teacher who has finally gotten a problem student to
admit, "I don't know." She collected the other
menus and marched away.
"You should never wait," said the husband. "You
may never see her again."
"Mm." His eyes darted from chicken to sole, sole
to chicken, around the page for any kind of help,
then back to tantalizing chicken and filet of the
finest Dover sole.
What if he didn't like the one he got—what if he
chose wrong? Could he get both? Eyes darted to the
prices—no, can t afford both. Chicken or sole?
CHICKEN OR SOLE???
Another vision snapped on in his mind—the other
three enjoying their well-chosen meals, and he in.
*4*

UT
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front of page four forever, his eyes bouncing back
and forth between third and last, chicken and sole.
A wave of nausea rose up to his head. The
restaurant closed, all the chairs up on the tables,
and his eyes still bouncing back and forth, chicken to
sole—
He dropped his menu and scraped his chair back.
"Excuse me. I need to... use the... men's room..."
He nearly knocked his chair over while getting up.
His wife looked after him and called, "Are you
alright? But he was already gone, stumbling
towards the door.
He found a stall with a lock that worked and slid it
into place. The walls were white. The floor was
white. The bit of porcelain between his pale knees
was white. Good. That would go with the wine. He
watched his hands shaking on his knees. They were
the whitest of all.
Back at the table, his wife was asking Jim, "Would
you go after him?"
"Uh, sure," he said, and left,
fumbling with his tie the whole
V
way.
Jim knocked on the locked
white door. "Um, it's me." A
minute later he had his host out
and leaning on a sink. He supported the pale man with a
strong tweed arm. "Do you feel
alright?"
Dale Marsh
"Not really. No." Eyes fixed
dn the floor, breathing in short,
quick gasps.
Let me call you a cab. Come with me and sit
down."
The hall was spinning. His hands looked as white
and clammy as dead fish, and his arms had goose
bumps like freshly plucked poultry. He cloaked a
laugh.
"What?"
"Nothing . . . nothing."
When Jim got back to the table his dinner was
waiting for him. The wife looked at him with concem and asked, "Is he alright?"
I think so. I called a cab. He should be fine once
he lies down."
"I'd better go with him."
And Jim s wife said, "Well, it's a good thing he
didn t order, because we would have wasted a
sole."
—or croquettes," his wife added, and hurried
away.

1
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The Nigger is Dead
—And it was a hot night,
A warm, windless,
Night, with
No stars. No stars at all, the sky
Was black. Torches flickered
In the blastfurnace night
And their shouts, my shouts,
My god, my shouts too,
Filled the blackened sky. And
All I could think was,
"Will he melt? Will he melt?"
And someone, a farmer named
Kendall who loved God
(I"ve seen him in the church on
Sunday, singing
Rock Of Ages)
Yelling in my ear,
"Kill the nigger, kill him dead!"
(Will he melt?)
And his broad, black, sweating face
Was empty and smooth
As he licked his cracked lips
Over and over.
They hoisted him into the night
And all I could think —
"Kill the nigger!"
—was why, why, why was
I there and—
"Kill the nigger!"
—I didn't really—
"Kill the nigger!"
Were my boys, my babies, peeking
Out the window, looking at the
Flickering torches and hearing the angry shouts
And thinking—
"Kill the nigger!"
—what fun?
The smell of gasoline hit my face
Like a slick, obscene wave.
But it was his face that was dripping.
My God, My God,
He doesn't even look afraid.
Kendall
(Rock of Ages
Give Us Strength)
is shouting at me,
"What the hell is wrong with you,
You goddamn niggerdover?!!?"
9

"Kill the nigger!"
"That's better," says Kendall.
(Rock of Ages, Will He Melt?)
A torch goes down, and fire fills
The starless night and
The heat, My God, the heat, oh God, oh, oh—
"Kill the nigger! Kill the-"
—The heat dries the tears off my face.
Kendall
(Rock of Ages
Kill the Nigger)
is jumping up and down like
He does sometimes at the dances
With his wife, his beautiful, beautiful wife.
Does he have a wife?
He's burning, he's melting,
Chocolate in the sun.
Oh God, God, God, tomorrow
Is Sunday—
"The nigger is dead!"
—And I will be kneeling in the small square box
Saying
"Father forgive me—
(The nigger is dead)
—For I have sinned."
And Kendall will sing and pray
And maybe go to the dance
And swing his wife around and around
And smile at her flushed face.
"Father
(The nigger
Forgive me
Is
For I have
Dead.)
Sinned."
And that will make it better,
That will make everything better,
That will make everything all right.
(The nigger is dead.)
Geoff Schmidt
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I Dream In Shadows
I dream in shadows;
Bloodied dreams that stay just long enough
To wet my frightened mind.
And often I awaken in the shattered early morning,
Startled, sweating, staring at the ceiling,
Staring without seeing;
And the ragged despair swells
And pushes at my chest,
Always on the edge of explosion.
God, I will never ever rise!
I am doomed to struggle, entwined
In the stale, stinking sheets of weakness
Which cover my life's bed.
And now I lay my head back
Upon my granite pillows
And dream;
Blood'red drearfis that differ not at all
From the moments I spend awake.
Geoff Schmidt
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Night Blooming Cereus
Today the tender white tips
poked out of green into hard light
and felt the pain at slipping through
green mouth into day.
My feet on the wet bricks of the path
then out onto the bridge
drawing the day's tears through
thick sounds and fog.
Returning home they had moved
a pink wound, exposed,
shelter for new life pulling back
on a day too cold for birth.
I dragged the heaving mother inside
to the butter warmth of kitchen.
Now the sweat of the teakettle
dots the brow.
I watch your children open,
green mother, larger, white'pink;
each day, when the kitchen door closes
me within, there is a fresh miracle.
Two new moons to guide me through
this early winter.
Cathy Taylor
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IN OUR OWN IMAGE

A COMPARISON OF COMPUTER AND HUMAN INTELLIGENCE
Kevin Schoch
Technology and computers seem to be the "buzz"
words of the 1980's. This is a time when you can
pick up virtually any weekly news magazine and
read about some new use of these
"high'technology" devices. Computers seem to go
into everything from washing machines to missiles.
Some would claim that computers are forming the
basis for the second industrial revolution. This
revolution could form a post'industrial society based
on information technologies and a service'oriented
economy. How is it, then, that these machines
known as computers have become so important?
What sets them apart from the already vast array of
remarkable machines that have been invented in the
last few hundred years? Certainly the automobile
changed our society, but it was really just an inv
proved version of the carriage. Our traditional rela'
tionship with technology has always been one
where it served to expand our own physical
abilities. Better cameras, cars and guns all allow us
to extend ourselves beyond our own limits.
How then does a computer represent a departure
from this relationship? The answer, perhaps not so
surprisingly, lies within ourselves. Computers repre'
sent a new facet of technology. If technology tradi'
tionally sought to extend our physical abilities
through the power of tools, then the computer
represents the first tool we have developed to
mechanically expand the power of our minds. This
idea is the key to understanding the usefulness of
computers. They consume nothing but energy and
produce nothing but information. They are truly in'
formation processing machines.
We have begun to develop an analogy here be'
tween machines and human beings. If our traditional
concept of controlling natural law (technology) is to
expand our physical abilities, and our goal in the
development of more sophisticated information
machines is to expand (or mimic) our mental
powers, then in some fundamental way we are seek'
ing, through the use of our own abilities, to create
ourselves in our own image.
Yet how can this be? Certainly machines have
become extremely sophisticated and are perhaps
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capable of doing many of the complex jobs that once
were done by hand, but how do computers have
anything to do with the way our own minds work?
The comment is often made that machines don't
think. That is true. In any reasonable definition of
independent thought, machines fail without a
doubt. Yet there does exist an underlying basis for
the design of computers that is strikingly similar to
the way many parts of our own minds work. This
should not be too surprising. What better model do
we have for an information processor than our own
mind? But before we discuss these similarities, let us
look at our own minds in a slightly different way.
We wish to know not so much how our mind
behaves, but what the duties it must perform are
and how they are organized. This organization will
be the basis for our understanding of computers, and
the underlying analogy we wish to develop. We will
then examine ourselves as the type of machine
known as the human being. Finally, we will address
the question: Are we as life forms completely deter'
minable? Or in the modern idiom: Is life computable?
Let us consider the mind as being the primary con'
trol unit over our bodies. The mind then has two
major responsibilities: the first is to watch over our
physical functions and the second is to provide the
necessary thought processes. That is, the processes
of the mind can be thought of as handling two major
functions. One is our input/output function with
the world around us. Great sections of the brain are
devoted to receiving and interpreting feedback from
our five senses. The information is delivered
to that part of our mind which controls thought pre
cesses. When interpreted for meaning, the raw data
becomes a basis for our reaction to the world around
us. This reaction directs us to step away from a
moving car, pick up a cup, or acknowledge another
person's presence with a "hello." Thus at some
level our mind has a simpel input/output structure.
Obviously this is a very simple model. However, in
its simplicity lies its strength. When the mind is
viewed in this way, we can expand upon our model
and fill in the substructure. In essence, we are look'
ing for a fine structure of functionality.

Erra ta
Page
Page
Page
Page
Page
Page
Page

4, line 8: For forbid read forbade
5, line 14: For distributing read disturbing
7, line 18: For really, He read really. He
13, line 39: For simpel read simple
25, line 19: For percieve read perceive
27, line 17: For becmes read becomes
36, line 19: For I'm read "I'm

The input/output structure of our minds, while
enormously complex in its own right, is relatively
straightforward. We can find devices for sensing
and manipulation in traditional technology. Analogs
for vision and mechanical work, such as cameras and
robots, are relatively straightforward. Let us then
concentrate on the other division of our functions,
that of thought processes.
Here we wish to develop the fine'Structure of our
thought model. Divorced from our physical setting,
what is the functional structure of our thought pre
cesses? The structure that I propose is that our
thoughts are composed of two things. Information is
the first component, and relationships between in'
formation are the second. If we accept this, then
the two major components in our minds are a
place to store information and a structure for its
manipulation. We will refer to these as memory and
logic, respectively. Here we should not let the word
"logic" take on too restrictive a meaning. What we
mean simply and generally by logic are the opera'
tions that our minds are capable of performing on in'
formation. These operations are vastly complex.
They include simple tasks in sequential logic such as
looking down the street, seeing a car come and
knowing not to step in front of it. However, looking
at two paintings by Rembrandt and being able to
discern that they were painted by the same artist is
a much different operation. Thus, we must look at
memory and logic separately, as they each have
their own substructure.
Memory can be thought of as the storage of infor'
mation for later retrieval. More than one type of
memory exists. We have memory for simple facts
such as the months of the year, our name or social
security number and so on; we also have a memory
for patterns and complex structures which we use in
driving a car, for example. Thus we seem to have
two types of memory, a simple factual memory and a
relational memory. Often it is difficult to separate
their function. In fact, some people might argue that
all facts are remembered by their relationship to
other facts. For our purposes, I would like to leave
the substructure at the simple level of facts and
ideas. We can remember both information and rela'
tionships of information (ideas).
One additional aspect of memory is worth noting.
The length of time we retain information varies
greatly with the type of information. We recognize
the existence of long, medium and short term
memory. Which type of memory is in use often
depends upon how important the information is to

us, and how frequently we use it. Thus memory is
hierarchically structured with time. Our long term
memory holds the most, but is the least accessible.
Our short term memory is very precise and readily
available, but does not hold much.
Let us now examine the manipulations our minds
are capable of performing on information. We have
given these manipulations the general title of logic.
Yet, as we have noted, there seems to be several
types of logic. The first, and by far the simplest form
of manipulation, is sequential logic. This can be
loosely described as our ability to follow a set of in'
structions or to draw simple conclusions from a pre'
defined set of circumstances with all values known.
This is the logic we depend upon every day to get us
to the post office, to eat our meals, and make our ap'
pliances work. This type of logic is often referred to
as formal or mathematical logic. It is relatively well
understood and has been refined to a very high
degree. Formal logic is crucial to the operation of
computers as well as ourselves; therefore we will
return to it later.
We will refer to our ability to perform nom
sequential logic as referential logic or RL. RL con'
sists of our ability to discern patterns, analogies and
relationships among highly disparate objects.
Without this sort of ability, it would be utterly irri'
possible to understand most forms of speech. Here
again we have relationships among information as
the basis for our structure. In RL these relationships
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the state of activity of our minds and tell us how to
react to it. When exceptionally "good" things are
happening to us, we become happy or ecstatic. We
are overloaded with positive feedback from our
minds, and thus we often laugh as a way of releasing
that tension. We can imagine similar releases invoke
ing grief, love or fear. Thus emotions seem to be
functionally external to thought processes. Yet the
primary function of emotions is to effect certain
changes in our thought patterns. Therefore emotions,
while separate, are a complex interaction of our se'
quential and referential logic capabilities which
relate to maintenance functions of our minds and
bodies.
We now have a working functional model of our
own minds. Since the structure can be more easily
discerned by using a diagram, one is included for
reference. How then does our mind have anything
to do with an electronic computer? To complete the
analogy we have been constructing, let us now ex'
amine the structure of a sequential computer by
tracing back through our model of the human mind
and looking for the analogous structures in the
machine.
The first large division we dealt with in our own
mind was the separation of thought processes from
input/output functions. Computers have a striking'
ly similar structure. Typically they contain the cir'
cuits of the computer on boards inside a box.
However, they must interact with the outside
world to gain information so that they can process it
and return the results. They can be hooked up to
barometers, cameras or thermometers to control
their own environment. They can signal the outside
world when they are "ready" to do work and they
often put a user off when they are too busy. Once
again we will not dig too deeply into the complex'
ities of the input/output system, except to note that
its sole purpose is to feed information to the com'
puter so that the computer can react to its environ'
ment in an appropriate manner.
The next level we discussed was the substructure
of our thought processes. We made division be'
tween logic and memory. In a computer, both of
these functions exist, yet they are vastly simpler
than those in our own minds. Memory is a crucial
component of information processing. Computer
memory, however, is of only one type—it will store
facts. In some special cases where human beings
have worked out the relationships between facts in
painstaking detail, these relationships can be stored
in objects known as data structures. Data structures
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meaning
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input/output

sensory feedback
taste
touch
smell
sight
hearing
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Functional Analysis

are not well defined in a formal sense. That is, we
do not start with a set of givens and work out the
rest. Instead we define things in terms of themselves
and their relationships to other objects. Language is
defined in terms of itself, as music is defined in terms
of the relationships between sounds. RL gives
human beings the ability to fit new information into
a larger scheme so that what we have is not just a
random collection of data, but a network of inter'
related facts associated by ideas and meaning. RL is
not understood very well at all. Computers cannot
preform it. It gives human beings the ability of in'
dependent thought. In fact, to understand RL
would be equivalent to understanding where ideas
come from. If these notions sound strange, perhaps
it is only because we must have ideas to discuss
ideas, an interesting exercise in RL itself.
If pure thought coupled with storage capacity is
composed of referential and sequential logic, the
question arises of how emotions fit into the scheme.
In a functional sense, our emotions serve to protect
our minds from themselves, and from the onslaught
of outside inputs. They also serve to direct our ac'
tions towards others as they relate to us. It is dif*
ficult to say much else and still maintain some
degree of precision. Yet emotions seem to arise as a
check on pure thought processes, to see that we as
beings are behaving in a manner that is in accord
with our own interests. In this light, emotions sense
15

are in a primitive sense analogous to ideas. They
represent relationships among seemingly unrelated
data. Likewise, computers have long, medium and
short term storage capacity, depending on how
often and how quickly the information is needed.
Storage is accomplished through a combination of
semiconductor and magnetic media technologies.
Thus we can see that computers also have the abili'
ty, albeit vastly less sophisticated, to store data and
to a lesser extent the relationships among data or
ideas.
Computers fail miserably at imitating the logic
functions of our minds. This is not to say that com'
puters do not have these functions, just that they
are really very simplistic for all their complexity. If
you recall, we divided generalized logic into sequen'
tial and referential logic. As we said before, sequen'
tial logic (SL) is understood very well, while referen'
tial logic (RL) is understood hardly at all. Com'
puters have excelled in SL. SL involves many of the
mundane but crucial tasks of symbol manipulation,
word processing, control functions and arithmetic.
Computers do not do mathematics, except for some
very simple theorem'proving programs.
Mathematics itself is a very human activity. Com'
puters do not develop new relationships, but they
are exceptionally good at carrying out the opera'
tions of already existing ones. This is the crucial dif'
ference between machines and humans. While we
are capable of referential logic and defining new rela'
tionships among old information, computers are not.
No one has yet envisioned a way to embody RL in a
machine. The whole field of Artificial Intelligence is
devoted to this project, but the results have been
slow and painstaking. To understand how to give a
machine RL ability, we will have to understand
where our own ideas come from. In essence we will
have to know ourselves as knowing beings.
The last division we discussed was that of emo'
tions. Since these are undoubtedly a complex inter'
action of RL and SL, to believe that a computer would
contain any of these characteristics is difficult. Yet
as sequential machines become more and more
sophisticated in their internal architectures, some of
these traits begin to be noticed. A computer spends
a great deal of time monitoring its own internal func'
tions. The most sophisticated machines have com'
plex rules about what should be done first. In
fact, these rules differ greatly from machine to
machine. Anyone who has worked on several types
of machines will attest to the fact that each of them
has their own characteristic responses to problems

that arise. In fact, even from model to model of the
same manufacturer, each machine will exhibit
peculiarities that are not part of the machine's
specifications. Thus, while computers do not have
emotions, due to a lack of RL, they do exhibit more
and more "peculiarities" as they become more
sophisticated.
Our analogy is now complete. Computers, in the
fundamental outline of their structure, are develop'
ing along the same lines as our own minds. With the
use of technology we are no longer limited to extend'
ing the power of our bodies. We now have a
mechanical way of extending our minds. Since our
mind governs our body, there should be little doubt
why computers constitute such a powerful force in
our society.
This brings us back to the final, seemingly in'
escapable, analogy. Through the use of technology
mankind has sought to create himself in his own inv
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age. Is this possible? Or a more compelling question:
Is life knowable? What species of machine is man?
Clearly these questions cannot be answered at this
time. Too little is known about our own minds and
our capabilities to control natural law. Yet we are
actively pursuing these questions with an insatiable
curiosity. If an answer is ever found, the impact
upon our conception of ourselves would be enor'
mous. What of our religion and beliefs? What wouldbe left in the universe for us if all parameters of life
were known? Does this ability provide us with the
next step in our own evolution? Can we improve
upon ourselves? and if so how? The questions are in'
triguing. The answers are probably less so. But one
thing is certain; if the knowledge is available, it will
be found.
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Patient
That pair of fixed blue eyes,
paler than the burned'out
desert sky in summertime,
so intent on something,
are stuck in a face
that just hangs off its bones,
limp; flaccid from underuse.
Only the eyes matter here.
The rest, flesh and bone,
is dried out, discarded, ignored;
endured only as temporary housing
for a bleached, motionless gaze.
What do those eyes see
in that space between retina
and the hospital wall?
To what other world
have they transported the life
absent from that lax face,
those leftover limbs?
Deserts and eyes keep
their secrets well.
Xandra Coe
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'What the Fire Takes Decay also Claims
for Emily
Picking leaves in our first year daze
we dried and crumbled them;
did not dare to harvest again.
"It's the seeds," we screamed, "We
forgot the seeds!"
We recalled the motions—
this one seasoned friendship,
this blaze consuming any builded worldrethought the fruitless colors.
"It's the earth," we admitted, "We
forgot the turning earth."
Now—this dying of pretty leaves
sees us fired as forests, and
the animals crawl over us ... .

•$

Curtis Coates

JI

"

I

nj-

I

'

1

m:v

- ^ , /T /U

i1

I> 1

•I;TJ ••!

Ill It

vi.

1'

|

t.

' ftk
' y

'r n

* >N

vi • fee

fttMi

*<

(

-!•

m

•I

.. r
> i

11,

,

m

/

zz*

V

TV

H-4

I)

I *

k

CiV'<te^.o^'

R

Chris Shea
24

THE MYTHICAL, THE ETHICAL AND THE AESTHETIC
IN PILGRIM'S PROGRESS
Greg Polly
In his Philosophy of Symbolic For>ns, Ernst
Cassirer details the emergence of various categories
of symbolic forms from the mythicabreligious con'
sciousness. The following paper attempts to analyze
Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress with regard to the
tensions between the emerging symbolic categories
which are evident within it.
This paper was originally an oral presentation
read for Eugen Kullmann's Symbolics of Mythology
seminar on November 9, 1982.

could first point to the theme of the pilgrimage. Inv
plicit in this motif is the notion that the self is
travelling toward a goal which lies outside itself.
The vision that Christian has when he reads the
book is an apocalyptic one of an impending future
destruction. As he puts it, "I am certain informed
that this our city will be burned with fire from
heaven."2 Cassirer notes that the apocalyptic vision
of the Old Testament prophets freed the human will
from the determinism of the mythic past to work
toward a future kingdom. In a similar way
Evangelist rebukes Christian as he mourns his
doom: "If this be thy condition, why standest thou
still?"3 Insofar as the possibility of the journey gives
Christian control over his fate, it gives him ethical
freedom. Consider in this regard the primitive,
magical mind as it is described by Cassirer. It has
two distinguishing characteristics: like Freud's id, it
attempts to absorb and control all the elements of its
experience without clearly distinguishing itself from
these experiences—and because it cannot see
beyond mere acquisition and control of objects, it is
ironically controlled itself by the accidents and par'
ticulars of its existence. But the pilgrim does not re'
main static and subjectively engulf the world—he
travels to a goal which is outside himself and yet at
the same time his completion.
Christian's recognition of the ethical apocalypse
shatters his unity with others and leaves him quite
alone; the ethos drives out the earlier, almost pan'
theistic sense of unity with other life. His wife and
children, thinking him insane, are "hardened against
him" and "quite neglect him".4 Concern with the
destination replaces even the bonds of the family; in
fact when Christian's family beckons him back to
the city he flees from them, covering his ears and
crying, "Life, life, eternal life.'"5 Christian must deny
natural human community for the sake of the goal.
In the same way—although he meets a number ot
characters, both helpful and hurtful, between the
City of Destruction and the wicked gate—he has no
real rapport with any until he meets Faithful, who is

I. The Ethical
According to Cassirer, the ethos emerges from the
mythos as the concept of self slowly develops itself
dialectically through the creations of culture. As
Cassirer puts it:
in creating its mythical, artistic forms the spirit does
not recognize itself in them as a creative principle . . .
The I creates for itself a kind of opposite in its own
products which seem to it wholly objective. And it
can contemplate itself only in this kind of projection.
In this sense the mythical gods signify nothing other
than successive selhrevelations of the mythical con'
ciousness.1

The mythical consciousness unwittingly projects
aspects of itself into its creations and then discovers
these truths in the objective works. The con'
sciousness which produces the earliest myths does
not percieve its own subjective selfhood; early ideas
of the soul—a symbol of psychological being—are at
first not considered the same as the "I". A per'
son's soul is a daimonic force, though a personal or
tutelary one, which takes control of the I. Only
when the I declares itself free of mythic domination
from these forces, declares free will and efficacy to
mold itself, does the ethos emerge in its entirety. In'
ner freedom and choice are the hallmarks of the
ethos, for only with these are there no ethical "ac'
cidents": in an ethical universe, only the deserving
are punished, for all selves can knowingly choose
and be held responsible for that choice.
In the phantasmagoric landscape of the Pilgrim's
Progress we can see a distinct progress in the dif'
ferentiation of the ethical from the mythic. We
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also travelling to Zion. Human community does
not grow out of a mythic sense of life'Unity in
Bunyan's world—in fact it does not seem to be much
of a social interaction at all. It is, at least in this life,
essentially a mutual parallel progression toward the
same goal.
The path followed to this goal is a straight one,
symbolically suggesting the undeviating moral
character of the journey along it, and it must cross
the river Death to come to the gates of the City. The
road itself seems to be a play on the etymology of
pilgrim, which means "one who walks through a
field." Christian walks alone and helpless in a field
when Evengelist points him beyond it to the gate
where his road will begin. And later, when Chris'
tian and his companion leave the road to take a
shortcut through a meadoii', they nearly meet their
end at Doubting Castle. It is not enough for
Bunyan's pilgrims to "walk through the fields"—a
symbol suggesting the mythic unity with nature.
Just as their path must go beyond death, they must
seek something beyond nature. As Cassirer points
out, when the ethos saw its birth within Judaism,
the aura of the sacred was quickly removed from
nature. The beginnings of the ethical consciousness
made nature a negative force, an opposite against
which it could define and understand its own in'
ward, subjective character of choice. Bunyan
himself does not denigrate nature—in the DeleC'
table Mountains, for instance, he uses it as a
positive symbol. But in a larger sense he shows
himself well within this Prophetic tradition, for on
the whole there is little "natural" description in the
book—indeed very little of the concrete at all. With
a few vivid exceptions such as the nightmarish bat'
tie with Apollyon, Pilgrim's Progress consists
mostly of rarefied conversations and debates be'
tween highly abstract characters. In other words
Bunyan's symbolic form places a heavy stress on the
subjective self, divested of its externals, in its raw
ethical interaction with other selves and with God.
Now while all of these are indications of the ways
in which the ethos controls the mythos in Pilgriui's
Progress, I think the strongest indication of the
presence of the ethical is the allegorical essence of
the work. To make this clear, perhaps we could con'
sider what a strictly ethical poetry would look like.
Cassirer tells us that linguistic expression can never
fully divest itself of mythic elements, and we can
probably accept this as true. But, as Cassirer notes,
we have in Plato's Republic an example of someone
who attempts to mold the mythos and put it to the

service of the logos.
In the Republic, Socrates attempts to erect his
own system of myth to compete with Homer's. His
mythos, however, would be a controlled one in
which the imagery would allegorically express only
the intellectual concepts of the logos rather than
creating by the inner laws of the mythical con'
sciousness. When in Book VII Socrates relates the
story of the men competing for the helm of a ship,
laughing at the dull navigator who stares up at the
stars, he is able to relate each element of the story to
a conceptual or abstract meaning. The ship is
political life; the men are politicians; the navigator is
the philosopher; the stars are philosophic
knowledge. The laws of the mythical consciousness
are here overthrown — each image corresponds to a
single idea. In this way poetry would encourage the
reader to look beyond the image, in fact to leave the
image behind and grasp the conceptual reality for
which it stood. The poetry itself would be a mere
gateway to concepts; rather than a mythos, we
would have disguised philosophy. The Platonic pro'
gram for an ethical poetry ends in what is essentially
allegory.
Bunyan invents his own characters, instead of US'
ing Biblical source material in Pilgriyu's Progress.
Most of his characters are reified personality traits
which Bunyan uses toward a didactic end. When
Christian and Faithful are arrested and put on trial in
the worldly town of Vanity Fair, the character of
each judge is simply a function of the name. Their
verdicts reflect thif: "Mr. Blind Man, the foreman,
said, I see clearly that this man is a heretic. Then said
Mr. No'Good, Away with such a fellow from the
earth. Ay, said Mr. Malice, for I hate the very looks
of him ... A sorry scrub, said Mr. High Mind . . .
Hanging is too good for him, said Mr. Cruelty."f) In a
similar way, Christian's companion Hopeful main'
tains the couple's optimism in Doubting Castle; Mr.
Worldly Wiseman preaches a life of earthly pleasure;
Mr. Obstinate stubbornly refuses to go on
pilgrimage. Places, too are hypostatized ethical
ideas—the hill of Difficulty, the town of Conceit. Prob'
ably most indicative of Bunyan's ethical method is
the character of Interpreter. At a dwelling along the
road, Interpreter leads Christian through various
rooms where he is shown visions. Each time Chris'
tian asks, "What means this?" and Interpreter inter'
prets the vision allegorically. With the inclusion of
this character, Bunyan seems to suggest that the way
of understanding religious images is the allegorical
and ethical one. There is a clear separation between
26

image and interpretation, as in Platonic poetry.
Clearly Bunyan's imagery is strongly dominated by
ethos.
Although the ethos is strong in Bunyan's work,
it is not complete. The mythos within the work
constantly restrains the ethos from its full
development. This should hardly surprise us, since
Cassirer has suggested that this kind of fluctuation
is characteristic of the religious mind, pulled as it
is between the primitive laws of mythical con'
sciousness and the developed laws of reason. What
is noteworthy about Pilgrim's Progress is that
despite the ethical development implicit within it,
Bunyan often seems to return to the most primitive
mythical motifs for the expression of that ethos.
Cassirer notes that as the mythic mind becomes
more sophisticated, mythical space becmes more
complex. But Bunyan does not
order his mythic space in the
complex manner of Dante—in
fact, he does not even make use
of the basic tripartite division of
4.
heaven, earth, and hell which
Christianity offers him. Just as
\
his faith wanted to simplify the
Anglican Church, so Bunyan's
art returns to a simpler and more
primitive spatial landscape—a
landscape of one horizontal
dimension, infested with an ar*
bitrary mixture of creatures both
natural and supernatural, places
both sacred and taboo.
The remnants of primitive mythos in the work ex'
ert their control of the ethos in more specific ways.
Cassirer has said that the heart of the ethical mind is
complete inner freedom and moral choice. Although
the motif of the journey suggests ethical freedom,
Bunyan's ethos has not left the mythic realm. It is
still strongly tainted with the mythic distinction of
sacred and taboo. Bunyan paints a spacial picture of
judgement: Christian is doomed because he is living
upon taboo ground, in the City of Destruction. In
addition, he carries a burden upon his back which he
fears will sink him into the grave; he loses this later
when he comes upon the holy ground on which
stands a lone cross. Now of course these spatial
representations could be merely artistic devices, ac
tually symbolizing issues of true ethical choice. Still,
Good Will tells Christian, "As to the burden, be
content to bear it, until thou comest to the place of
deliverance; for there it will fall from thy back

itself."7 It is not entirely clear how Christian is ac
tive in his redemption. Other scenes are even more
ambiguous. Christian's motivation to share the
gospel with others does not seem to stem from a
concern for their welfare, but for his own. He is
obligated to preach to them so that he will be free of
the bloodstain of their guilt. He is relieved, for in'
stance, when Good Will assures him that since he
attempted to share his revelation with his family, he
has "delivered his soul" from their blood.8 Indeed,
when Faithful meets Pliable, who has turned back
from pilgrimage, he feels no obligation to address the
backslider at all. As he says, "I met him once in the
street, but he leered away on the other side, as one
ashamed of what he had done; so I spake not to
him."y Pliable's shame would seem to suggest that
he could still be persuaded, but Faithful can
presumably wash his hands of
responsibility from the outset
because of Pliable's apostasy.
Perhaps the best indicator of
the status of ethos in Bunyan's
work is the treatment of Ignorance.
Ignorance comes down from
a side path onto Salvation
Road, whereupon Christian and
Hopeful immediately warn him
that he cannot arrive at the
Celestial City unless he enters
the road from the proper gate. In
the
discourse that follows,
DM.
Ignorance points out that those of
his country do not know the way
to the wicket gate, that he has after all left his coun'
try for the promised land, and reveals that like his
companions he believes that "Christ died for sin'
ners, and that I shall be justified before God from
the curse, through his gracious acceptance of my
obedience to the Law." Despite major points of
agreement between their views, Christian disputes
with Ignorance, insisting primarily that this "maketh
not Christ a justifier of thy person, but of thy ac'
tion, and of thy person for thy action's sake."10 For
this mistaken interpretation of the Word, Ignorance
is ultimately consigned to hell. Before that, Christian
wonders if such ignorant men ever have true convic
tion of sin. He speculates: "Sometimes (as I think)
they may; but they being naturally ignorant, under'
stand not that such convictions tend to their good."11
There seems to be here a closed ethical loop. If Ig'
norance is to be held morally responsible in a universe
of true ethos, he must have freely and knowingly ex'
27

ercised choice between two beliefs. But Ignorance,
by the very trait he is meant to represent, does not
and cannot have the knowledge necessary to make
the correct choice. If he believes wrongly, he knows
not what he does. Yet still in Bunyan's world he is
held fully responsible for his opinions. Hopeful at
one point, wondering what it means to believe,
remarks that "believing and coming was all one; and
he that came ... he indeed believed in Christ." 12
Ignorance comes, in the best way he is able, but that
is not enough for him: he must hold the proper doc'
trinal beliefs as well. Here the ethos is restrained
from its final progress by the my thus of sacred and
taboo. In this case the mythos has been removed

vey. In the earliest mythic mind, the sign has not
yet achieved a symbolic function but is still an ob'
ject among other objects—but it is even at this
stage an object full of special power and meaning.
And conversely, at the height of religious expres'
sion, the most supreme religious truths cannot shake
off their reliance upon sensible imagery. The tension
between the sign and the signified is eternal in the
religious consciousness; this opposition is only
resolved when we step up into the realm of the
aesthetic. The tension is relieved because the sign
is, in a sense, divorced from the signified. "For it is
characteristic of the aesthetic trend that here the
image is recognized purely as such, that to fulfill its
function it need give up nothing of itself and its con'
tent."14 The referent of the image is its own inner
form. The objects of art "confess themselves to be ih
lusion as opposed to the empirical reality of things;
but this illusion has its own truth because it
possesses its own law."15 Inner form is the hallmark
of the aesthetic. Cassirer anticipates here the New
Critics who, under John Crowe Ransom, would
develop a similar Neo'Kantian aesthetic some fifteen
years later at Kenyon College. But if inner form
distinguishes the aesthetic, Pilgrim's Progress is
again in an ambiguous position.
As a dissenter from the practice and belief of the
Anglican church, Bunyan was prevented from
preaching by law and jailed many times when he
refused to comply. It was in Bedford jail that he
composed Pilgrim's Progress: confined by his
culture, Bunyan's ever'active religious con'
sciousness responded by confining itself to operate
within the limits of an extended fictional narrative.
He says in his Prologue, "I only thought to make/ I
knew not what: nor did I undertake/Thereby to
please my neighbour: no, not I/I did it my own self
to gratify."16 Here is another suggestion of the
aesthetic perspective emerging from religious con'
sciousness, for alongside all the didactic motivations
for creating — which we can be fairly sure were pre'
sent — Bunyan claims there was too an element of
creation for its own sake, of the individual artist in
an intimate relation with his work. This turning in'
ward of consciousness to a concern for the work in
itself is a step from the religious toward the
aesthetic realm.
Still, for Bunyan this is not a large step. Pilgrim's
Progress remains an allegory. Remember that
Cassirer says that the images of art refer to nothing
beyond the total form of the work. But it is in the very
essence of allegory that its images refer covertly to

/
D.M.

from physical objects and places and applied to the
realm of opinion. Certain opinions are sacred and
therefore salvational; others are taboo and bring
damnation. The importance of the intent behind the
opinion, the "movement of the soul", as Augustine
would put it, toward or away from God, is still am'
biguous in Bunyan's religion and his fictional work.
Within the larger framework of the book, in fact,
salvation depends upon more than the ethical choice
of the I. Christian would have remained in the
Slough of Despond were it not for the character of
Help; he would not have made it through the Valley
of the Shadow of Death had the sun not risen; and
in the final analysis it can be said as much of Christian
as it was of Little Faith that "twas more by good
Providence than by his endeavor"13 that he reached
the Celestial Gate.
II. The Aesthetic
Cassirer states that the religious consciousness is
characterized by a tension, an oscillation between
the sensible form of its imagery and the meaning
beyond all images which this imagery tries to con'
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ideas and abstractions far beyond the narrative
frame—so here the aesthetic resolution of tension
between sign and signified is not achieved. In fact
we could raise the question whether allegory is prop'
erly art. Ransom is blunt on this point. For him
"Platonic Poetry" or allegory is "science" (that is,
abstractions) "which masquerades as poetry."17
Curiously enough, where the allegory indicated that
the ethos was strongly emerging in Pilgrim's Pro
gress, it would seem to indicate that the aesthetic is
not yet in full bloom.
From Cassirer's definition, we could consider an
allegory aesthetic if its outer meanings did not in'
trude directly into the story—if they were covert
and if an inner form existed without them. In other
words, allegory can be seen as a means to an end;
but if the means can be divorced and have its own
selFcontained form without any reference to that
end, it could from at least one point of view be call'
ed aesthetic. We need not know about the Russian
Revolution to understand Animal Farm, because
the story is contained within its own terms. Orwell
does not allow the outer historical meanings to come
into the work itself. This is not the case with
Pilgrim's Progress. The didactic and religious end is
not kept covert and away from center stage.
Although the story purports to allegorize the
redemption of the Christian soul, Bunyan's
characters quote the Scripture not of their fictional
world, but of our own. When Christian forgets his
scroll in the arbour and must retrace his steps to find
it, Bunyan intrudes parenthetically, "Thus it hap'
pened to Israel, for their sin; they were sent back
again by way of the Red Sea."17Sometimes Christ is
allegorically "the lord of that city"; other times he is
simply Christ. Bunyan allegorizes some elements of
his story, but many he leaves undisguised — rather
as if Lenin were to appear in Animal Farm to en'
courage the animals to revolt. The result is that the
boundaries of Bunyan's fictional world never "close
it off' entirely; it never fully develops the quality of
selFcontainment and selFreference which defines
the purely aesthetic.
But leaving the question of allegory aside, we
might compare Pilgrim's Progress to other works
of religious art like Paradise Lost or The Divine
Comedy. Like Bunyan's work, these poems were
written by religious men, probably for religious ends
— yet they are fully within the aesthetic realm
because of their form: each part finds a proper place
within the whole according to aesthetic laws. In
contrast to this aesthetic attention to inner form,

recall that the mythic mind has no causal or logical
law in the way it connects its percepts and its web
of meaning. Two things which appear close together
in time or space, or have a physical similarity, are
immediately linked for that reason alone. Myth
evolves by the law of metamorphosis.
While Bunyan's artistic efforts are not quite so
primitive as this, his creative process does seem
closer to the mythic mind than the aesthetic in many
ways. The only organizing structure in the book is
the motif of the journey. The City of Destruction
lies at one end of Bunyan's landscape, the Celestial
City at the other; the movement of the narrative is
Christian's journey between them on the road of
salvation. But the events that transpire along the
way have no real pattern, and do not follow from one
another by any aesthetic or logical necessity. The
unfolding plot is episodic and arbitrary, as if Bunyan
simply reached for the nearest image at hand in his
Bible and immediately placed it within the nar'
rative. He manages to throw in almost every Biblical
image he can think of. Like a visitor in a museum,
Christian happens upon the Tree of Life from
Genesis, the River of Life from Revelation, the cross
and sepulchre of Christ, and even Lot's wife, still
preserved in salt by the side of the road. Sometimes
Bunyan does not even use the obvious symbolic
potential of his source material. We would expect
him to use the Valley of the Shadow of Death as its
name suggests—that is, as the final test Christian
must undergo before death. Instead Bunyan places it
far earlier along th^ road, near the beginning of the
journey. There seems to be no particular reason for
its location within the narrative; in fact it does not
seem to represent Death, although Bunyan's ex'
planation that "Christian must needs go through it,
because the way to the Celestial City lay through
it" would seem to suggest that.18 Christian comes
upon death at the end of his journey, and perhaps
most surprisingly of all, Bunyan symbolizes it there
with a river—more a pagan than a typically Chris'
tian representation. Bunyan's mind seems to see its
source images in their immediacy and to invest them
with the most immediate meaning at hand—as I
have said, a very mythic way of seeing. Indeed, the
mvtlto.s powerfully dominated Bunyan's imagina'
tion even in real life; of the Devil he once reported,
"Sometimes I have thought I have felt him behind
me, pull my clothes."In any case, this often gives
Bunyan's landscape the shifting, alogical character
of myth.
Pilgrim's Progress is a work of religious didactics;
30

it intends to be neither purely ethical nor purely
aesthetic. Within the literary canon, Pilgrim's
Progress is looked upon rightly as a primitive aes*
thetic — and consequently it is viewed with a slight
condescension. But it is perhaps unjust to judge
Bunyan from a perspective that is not his own.
Pilgrim's Progress shows the religious consciousness
standing in its own progress at the threshold of the
ethical and the aesthetic. As a spiritual document
which reveals the tensions between these emerging
symbolic categories and the religious ground from
which they spring, it is a work of its own special
power. Insofar as it is enlightened by the work of
Cassirer, perhaps we can see in it yet another kind
of progress of the human spirit.
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Stephen Hays

Hugh Is Dying
Hugh runs what's left of his fingers
Down my spinal cord.
He breathes twice and stops.
My nerves echo
Once
Twice.
Is it possible to be trapped,
Suspended in a net of nervesReal nerves—the sticky, dripping
Grey and white fibers
Torn from brainstem and fingertips?
Hugh breathes once twice and stops.
Coughing brings blood and filthy scraps of nerves.
Unwiped, it
Clots in his beard
Drips on his shoulder.
Shivering, trapped, he touches my spinal c6rd,
Twists it in veined hands,
Knots in a net.
He's got me stuck in his death
Hot and sticky and warm, fibrous.
Pam Andree
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Objection a THopital
Je r£ve et je crkve,
Cependant je me lfcve
Et saute vers la vie que j'ai voulue.
Mon lent hallali,
On en a Tanalyse:
"C'est seulement la phase du debut."
Mes chers docteurs'sages,
Ne poussez pas ma rage,
ChercheZ'moi! non pas vos livres aigus.
Videz ces argons!
Oubliez "nos moutons"!
Ces betises, nous n'y reviendrons plus.

The Hospital Objection
I'm dreaming and dying; ncmetheless, I get up and leap for the life that I wanted. My
long drawn'out death, they have the analysis: "It's only the initial phase." My dear
wise doctors, don't prompt my rage, look, for me! not your narrow hooks. Throw
yourselves from those saddles! Forget about "the point"! We''!/ never get hack to that
nonsense again.
•
Will Talpey
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THE LITTLE ROOM
Victor Peterson
I
"Do you see that huge bird there?" my grandpa
asked, pointing at the heavy grey'white bird gliding
toward the edge of the dune. It landed and walked
awkwardly to a nest in the reeds.
"It's a heron," he continued. "Not a great white
heron; a grey heron. They are indigenous to the
Great Lakes. They're not as large as the great
whites."
I nodded my head.
He took my hand and we walked closer to the
reeds. I knocked the sand about with my toes.
Twenty yards from the heron's nest my grandpa
planted the legs of his folding chair in the sand, sat
and began a charcoal sketch of the heron. His hands
did not move rapidly, yet his strokes were brisk and
sure, the way a man moves when he has not so
much talent as experience. I watched the flashing
brilliance of his white hair, the only thing about him
that lacked color; his brilliant white head bob up and
down between the bird, the paper, and the sky.
"1 like birds," I offered.
"Shhh," he warned.
I buried my toes in the sand, then dug further,
covering the rest of my feet until I felt the wet clay
beneath.
We left shortly after the heron had flown off into
the evening twilight. My grandfather walked with
the folding chair under one arm, my hand in the
folding chair hand, and an unfinished sketch of a
grey heron—which was not as large as a great white,
and was indigenous to the Great Lakes—in the other
hand.
"Thank you for taking me bird'Watching with
you," I said as we climbed into the car.
"Sure, I enjoyed having you," my grandpa replied,
smiling faintly.

could not argue, had to be true. I thought to myself,
how many other families would bring their grand'
parents into their home? Grandparents whom
they obviously knew were ill? Even though I avoid
being selfless whenever possible, it made me feel a
little noble.
My grandfather had always reminded me, for
some vague reason, of one of those Hemingway
heroes; the acceptance of pain seemed to dominate
his life. That was the way he had grown up and that
was how he lived. I had always thought that very
interesting. But I cannot say that he always ac'
cepted his lot. I remember a story my father had
told me about a sailboat race. My grandpa had raced
sailboats in the fifties.
He had owned a boat named "Scarlet." Now I
can't pretend to know all the rules of sailboat rac'
ing—in fact, I've been on a boat once, and that was
long after my grandpa had died—but I do know that
they are quite complicated, though 1 can tell you
that they are based upon where a boat is and its
relationship to the wind. And I can tell you
that such things exist as "windward" and
"leeward" boats. Simply put, the windward boat is
that which is closest to the wind, and the leeward is
that which is furthest from the wind. If you were to
stand behind a building during a storm, to keep
sheltered, you would be leeward and the building
windward. At any rate, in this particular race,
Scarlet was in the lee of another boat; the leeward
boat almost always has the right of way. This other
boat would not keep its nose hard on the wind and
kept falling off and blanketing the wind from Scarlet.
"Keep it up," my grandpa would say, but the boat
would fall back down.
"Goddamn it!" my grandpa yelled. "Keep it up!"
The windward boat fell off again.
"Goddamn it! Keep it up!" he yelled again. You
never heard my grandpa yell, but when he screamed
"Goddamn it!" it sounded as if God had actually for'
saken you and damned you to Hell.
"Goddamn it!" he yelled again. "I told you to keep

II.
My grandparents moved in with us during the
winter because my father had felt that it would be
very good for them to be around people. That, I
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away!" And he proceeded to beat the hell out of the
windward boat's toerail, accenting each syllable
with a swing of the winch handle he gripped.
Remember, this was in the fifties, when the toerails
were all wood and about two to three inches high.
Every swing of the handle left a two inch gouge.
The windward boat tacked away.
My grandfather would also give the shirt off his
back, as they say, if you really needed it. I guess he
and my grandma practically supported my parents
after they got married. Grandpa was also quite
fascinated by the Mexican culture. He often painted
oils of the various sellers and merchants he had met
on his visits to Mexico. Some of the paintings were
quite good, others only average. The good paintings
you had to develop a taste for, like you had to
develop a taste for espresso, or dark rum, or even
my grandpa himself.
However, I have digressed from the subject a bit. I
remember the day my grandpa died. It was around
the beginning of March, I think, when the winter
was just ending. At any rate, I had been expecting
his death for awhile. Not anticipating—no one had
anticipated something like that. I had simply tried to
prepare myself.
But death struck, as it usually does, unexpectedly.
I was asleep in the basement, tossing with
restlessness. I awoke to the sounds of heavy
footsteps on the floor above. Feeling uneasy, I tried
to sleep, thinking that my brothers were fighting.
Then I heard voices; loud, primitive, muffled voices,
and more footsteps; urgent, shuffling footsteps. I
wanted to go up and tell my brothers to shut their
mouths.
Then a thick black feeling crept down my throat
into the pit of my stomach. Grandpa was dying. I
felt sick, I knew what was happening. I had not
heard a siren, nor seen the lights, but I knew what
was happening. I lay silent, as the darkness closed
around me. A street lamp shone in the window.
The street was vacant. I became aware of the cracks
that ripped, like a spider's web, across the ceiling.
Sometime that summer we would have to replaster
the ceiling. There were so many things to do that
summer that I didn't want to think about it.
Later, my sister would tell me of the great gurgling
gasp my grandfather had made just before he died.
But for the moment I did not know this. All I knew
was that on the floor above me someone was dying.
The black emotion rose in my throat and I began to
sweat. It was funny that a person could lose con'
sciousness of his bodily functions at a moment like

that.
I closed my eyes tightly, attempting to convince
myself that I was just dreaming. The footsteps
pounded and the light continued to shine in the win'
dow, but the illusion would not elude me. I thought
how my room in the basement reminded me of some
dark, unlit cathedral. I wondered if the cracks in the
ceiling were not caused by the weight of the great
man above me. I saw Lot, in the corner, bid me from
Gomorrah.
"Jesus," I muttered, but dared not move. I knew
that if I moved, Satan himself would come get me —
reach out from under the bed and swallow me up.
Everyone knows that the Devil's favorite haunt is
an abandoned church. A church with cracks in the
plaster.
The radiator hissed. That scared the hell out of
me and I shot a glance over to the window. The
street lamp still poured light through that tiny open'
ing. The barren branches of the shrubs outside the
window formed stark fingers in the night. There
was a little room adjoining mine—a room with no
door. Blackness leapt from the open doorway. That
was the door to Hell, I thought. Get out of bed and
the Devil's gonna drag me to Hell.
I thought about a painting my grandfather had
done a few years earlier. It had hung in the living
room of my grandparent's apartment, but now it
was stored in that adjoining room. The painting was
of a shoemaker in Mexico City. The shoemaker was
behind a screen, so that all you saw of the
shoemaker was his silhouette. He looked very lone'
ly, tapping away on his shoes in the abandoned
market square. Red, grey, and black dominated the
scene. An odd color scheme, I thought. That was
one of those paintings you had to develop a taste
for.
My grandpa would probably rather be painting
than dying, I thought. Then I scolded myself; what
a dumb and senseless thought! Then I thought it
again, and it did not seem so senseless. I wondered
why Satan would want to swallow up my grand'
father's paintings.
"Jesus," I muttered again.
Then I noticed something that I had missed. The
footsteps were gone; silence. Dark red silence
poured like blood from the floor above. The stark
fingers scratched at the window pane. I thought,
he's dead . . . thank God he is dead. And I hated
myself for that thought. How could I possibly have
thought such a thing? I detested myself as I detested
the blackness in the pit of my stomach. Satan come
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very slim chance, but it may have been possible. My
father had decided against that. "Let him be at
peace," was my father's explanation. My father
never was able to accept seeing someone in pain.
Good, I thought. At least I did not have to make
that decision.
But for the moment I wanted Grandpa to rise: I
wanted him to live; to emerge from that little room
after three days and show me the holes in his hands.
To show me that death was just a game; the elusive
illusion. To pass his hand over the ceiling and heal
the cracks in the plaster. To paint people into the
picture so that the shoemaker would not be lonely.
To rise from the dead and say, "I love you." And to
toss that winch handle into the sea.
That night I could hardly sleep. I kept waiting for
Grandpa to emerge from the little room and
apologize.
"To hell with the basement," I muttered. I'm gc
ing to sleep upstairs from now on." But I stayed the
rest of the night in the basement. I was already
detaching myself from the moment. Soon it would
become "experience" to be reckoned with later.
And yet I have not moved. I am still in this base'
ment, below the cracked and sagging ceiling. The
cracked and sagging ceiling which, to this date,
refuses to heal. Below the floor on which the great
man once sketched, painted, and died. And next to
the shoemaker who deplores friendship. Next to the
half sketched heron, which is indigenous to these
parts, and not as great as the great white. And I am
still in this basemen^, below the cracked and sagging
ceiling, searching for a canvas on which to paint. As
we all must do. Amen.

get me! I thought. Rip me all to hell and drag me
down that lonely street for having conceived such a
thing.
But he was dead; Grandpa was dead. No denying
it. I reasoned to myself. He was in severe pain and
now he is dead, and that was why I had thought
that it was good that he had died. But that was not
the truth; I did not know why I had thought that. I
felt sick again.
The perspiration began to dry on my face and I
realized how chilly the room was. I'd better turn up
the heat, I thought. But I did not. I lay in bed,
restless and thoughtless until sleep crept into the lit'
tie room and took me.
In the morning I went up the steps to get ready for
school.
"Grandpa died last night," my mother said.
"I know," I replied.
Tears quivered in her eyes.
"You don't have to go to school," she said, put'
ting her hand on my shoulder.
I moved my shoulder so that she would have to
withdraw her hand, or let it drop. "No, I'll go to
school," I said. "It might be good for me."
The rest of the day felt irrelevant; senseless and
endless, like many thousands of other days. At
lunch I thought, Grandpa died last night. He went
into that darkness at close of day. He went into that
little dark room to find his paintings . . . What
would happen if I burned all of grandpa's paintings?
Would he finally be dead? Would he damn me to
hell? Or would he wander the earth in search of a
canvas and brush?
Later, I found that the paramedics could possibly
have revived my grandfather. It would have been a
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I saw a dog sleeping on the road.
Insects raced to consume its body before it awoke.
No one owns it now.
Yesterday, it wasn't in my way.
Tomorrow, it will be.
The next day, a little less so.
Until I don't have to think about it
anymore.
R.T.F. Inman
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AWARDS
Hi^ti awards the following prizes: The Denham Sutcliffe
Prize for the best critical essay; The Edgar Collings Bogar'
dus Prize for poetry; the Rahming Prize for Art; The
Charles Monroe Coffin Prize for short stories; the John C.
Neff Prize for expository prose. Winners of these prizes will
be announced in the spring issue.

SUBMISSIONS
Submissions are now being accepted for the spring edition
of Hi^ti. Please submit your essays, artwork, poetry,
photography, fiction, translations, and book reviews to
Peirce 6 or to the Hi^u box in the Student Activities
Center.

PATRONS
The Hil{d staff would like to thank the following patrons for
their support:
Colonial Men's Wear, 101 South Main Street, Mount Vernon
G.R. Smith & Company, 101 South Mulberry Street, Mount Vernon
Heckler Drugs, 122 South Main Street, Mount Vernon
J.R. Michaels, 216 South Main Street, Mount Vernon
Printing Arts Press, Mount Vernon
Tomahawk Hollow, Quarry Chapel Road, Gambier

38

•

•I

/rn

4 ifc
w

ii ::

''

r

' nm

•
*
Attn
r - ••' • J!

• •V-

«
y

••:

L

i*1"

-

•J.*V

<

*

•

6l
i

J

,1

;^
K

I

J

ftgj

29

x aaigF%i§

i.,4/

.•_«

\l

k V

s^T;
Founded 1935

m/J

'*mL

r

i...
Kenyon College
Gambier, Ohio 43022

r

MB

f

• .'•'

*?53

